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DOES THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS CORRESPOND TO LOCAL
DEMAND?
HONGMEI YI, DENISE HARE and LINXIU ZHANG
Recently China’s central government has promoted public goods investment in
pursuit of rural development and poverty reduction. However, the top down nature of
investment planning may lead to mismatches between public goods projects and the
demands of local residents. Using village- and household-level survey data, this study
seeks to identify the determinants of project implementation, focusing on investments
in roads, drinking water, and irrigation. Contrary to some popular perception, our
results suggest symmetry between farmers’ reported demand and the types of projects
implemented in their villages. The relative contribution of local demand to project
implementation is seen to vary, however, across different types of public goods. (JEL
D71, H41, H77, P35)
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, China’s central govern-
ment has emphasized public goods investment
in pursuit of rural development and poverty
reduction in rural areas. More than 310 billion
yuan1 from central government sources was
invested in the agricultural sector and rural
areas between 2001 and 2005 (National Devel-
opment and Reform Commission, Department of
Rural Economy 2006). Leadership has signaled
new commitment to the support of rural China
through investment projects and other programs
(World Bank 2007), and results of recent sur-
vey research support the validity of these claims
(Zhang et al. 2007).
However, substantial components of pub-
lic goods investment decision-making are top
down, potentially leading to mismatches
between investment projects and the demands
of local residents. For instance, Rozelle et al.
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(2005, p. 19) assert that in many cases, invest-
ment projects initiated by transfers from national
and provincial governments “. . . do not meet
the real needs of the villagers” and that “. . .
one of the main problems of fiscal transfers
today is a lack of clear governance process that
gets the right amount of funding to the right
project.” Misallocation of public good invest-
ment resources may severely hinder achieve-
ment of the economic and social goals that
motivate those transfers. As the 1994 World
Development Report argues, “Infrastructure can
deliver major benefits in economic growth,
poverty alleviation, and environmental sustain-
ability—but only when it provides services that
respond to effective demand and does so effi-
ciently” (World Bank 1994, p. 2).
Prior to the reform era, public goods invest-
ment decisions were almost entirely under the
command of brigade, commune, and higher lev-
els of government, well removed from the com-
munities in which final project implementation
occurred (Ye 1997). Beginning with the house-
hold responsibility system introduced in the late
1970s, policy reforms have generated significant
increases in various facets of local autonomy,
giving local leaders a greater say in fiscal affairs
and local economic development (Oi 1999).
This move toward greater decentralization could
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improve the efficiency of public good resource
allocation (Tiebout 1956). However, Tiebout’s
argument relies critically on a few key assump-
tions, including perfect mobility and informa-
tion (in order that citizens may choose to live
in the communities that best meet their par-
ticular preferences), as well as a democratic
decision process guiding taxation and spending
outcomes. Whether these assumptions are appro-
priate to the case of most developing countries
has been challenged by Bardhan (2002). In the
case of China, the household registration system
is a critical impediment to population mobil-
ity. Although the rural migrant workforce may
seem massive relative to that of any other coun-
try, it nonetheless constitutes only a moderate
portion of the rural population. Moreover, many
migrants leave family members behind, and liv-
ing on the margins of their destination commu-
nities, often lack access to even the most basic
provisions of public goods and services there
(Li 2008). However, village elections offer some
proximate opportunity for citizen input to local
resource allocation decisions. For instance, the
advent of local elections seems to have increased
at least the volume of public good investment
according to Luo et al. (2007a) where it is
reported that the democratic election of village
leaders is positively correlated with the level of
public good provision.
To be sure, the central government’s role
in rural public goods’ investment decisions
remains strong in rural China. For instance,
upper level officials continue to maintain a
strong hand in local decision-making through
their involvement in the appointment of local
cadres (Oi and Rozelle 2000), and the perfor-
mance evaluation structures create incentives
for local cadres to give considerable weight
to the objectives of their upper level counter-
parts (Liu and Tao 2007). At the same time,
local interests and resources are not completely
divorced from public goods investment out-
comes, even in the face of a top-heavy decision-
making apparatus. As shown by Zhang et al.
(2007), local resources contribute significantly
to project implementation. Consideration of the
recent tax for fee reform provides insight into
why local leaders need to pay attention to vil-
lagers’ demands for public goods and services.
The reform actually places limits on unautho-
rized fee collections by village leaders, and to
that end may have impaired village capacity
for project self-finance (Luo et al. 2007b). At
the same time, however, the changed terms of
revenue collection and spending, coupled with
the pressure generated by elections, may have
increased the responsiveness of leaders to the
preferences of local residents. Under the terms
of the tax for fee reform, according to the princi-
ple of “one affair, one discussion” (yi shi yi yi ), a
ceiling is placed on the amount that may be col-
lected from each villager annually—it is deter-
mined according to local conditions but most
commonly set at 20 yuan (Ministry of Agricul-
ture 2000, 2007). In this context, identification
of the project most worthy of pursuit, and taking
steps to fully fund it, has become a more impor-
tant responsibility of leaders at the village level.
Amidst the progression of fiscal reforms, no
one has examined the specific question that our
study asks, that is, how well does the observed
pattern of across-village allocation of public
goods investment correspond to variations in
local public goods demands? The overall goal
of this paper is to examine the determinants of
village public goods investment projects, focus-
ing in particular on the correspondence between
local demand and project implementation and
investment. To meet this goal, we have three
specific objectives: (1) to describe recent pat-
terns of public goods investment in China, (2) to
measure local demand for a few specific pub-
lic goods, and (3) to assess the impact of this
demand on the public goods projects undertaken.
We are mindful that within the category of pub-
lic goods, some goods are more public (i.e.,
have higher spillovers) than others, and we bring
this distinction to bear in the discussion of our
findings. Finally, we examine villagers’ political
participation as a mechanism for revealing their
public goods’ demands and consider the impact
of participation on project outcomes across the
spillover dimension.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II describes in further detail current pol-
icy and practice regarding public goods invest-
ments in rural China. Section III introduces the
data used in the analysis, summarizing villagers’
responses to our questions about their public
goods’ demands and reporting on some ways in
which they reveal these demands to village lead-
ers. Section IV provides the results of our empir-
ical estimations. Section V concludes the paper.
II. PUBLIC GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL
CHINA—POLICIES AND PRACTICES
Responsibility for provision of most pub-
lic goods and services in China is diffused
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across a remarkably wide array of government
levels. For instance, the center, province, prefec-
ture, county, and township all engage in spend-
ing for items such as education, health care,
cultural development, support for agriculture,
public security, and social welfare (Qiao and
Shah 2006). Moreover, the village, a community
rather than government unit in China, also plays
an important role not only in terms of expendi-
ture share, but also in the final implementation,
management, and monitoring of projects (Zhang
et al. 2007). Although a rather notable burden
of delivery responsibility falls on lower lev-
els of government and the village, much of the
decision-making power rests much higher. The
central government determines the fiscal capac-
ity of local government through its policy on
tax rates and assignment shares. At the same
time, minimum levels of service delivery often
are mandated at the central level, such as com-
pulsory education through middle school.
Much of the recent published scholarship on
China’s fiscal system has been relatively criti-
cal of its effectiveness. The fundamental ability
of local government to operate effectively is
called into question, given the incentives and
constraints built into the current fiscal system.
For one, the bloated size of local government,
largely proportional to population, and result-
ing from the higher level government mandates,
creates considerable financial burden in poor
regions (Zhang 2006). Moreover, upper level
interventions to finance the payroll of cash-
strapped local governments only facilitates the
maintenance of excess staff whose wages come
at the expense of local service provision in the
long run (Wong 2007). Instead of enabling local
governments to better meet the public goods and
service demands of their communities, transfers
are reported to distort patterns of local spend-
ing and to create incentives for rent-seeking
behavior among local officials (Liu and Tao
2007). Further compounding the problem, cadre
evaluation systems may lead resources to be
applied where they will score the most reward
points rather than the greatest social benefit (Lin,
Tao, and Liu 2006). Mechanisms that reward
local governments for their good performance
in public goods and services delivery are lack-
ing and have been recommended as a way to
increase accountability and compliance (World
Bank 2007).
Furthermore, the inability of many local
governments to support the menu of services
mandated from above is a persistent problem,
and hits poor areas especially hard (Wong
2007; World Bank 2007). Service gaps between
regions are reported to be wide (Park et al.
1996), corresponding to increasing disparities in
private incomes (Fan 2005; Wong 2007). In fact,
the current system of decentralization of service
responsibility may further exacerbate regional
differences in economic growth prospects (Lin,
Tao, and Liu 2006; Zhang 2006). Certainly,
the regional disparity that characterizes China’s
rural public goods allocation cannot be fully
explained as the outcome of a Tiebout (1956)
efficient matching mechanism as described in
the previous section.
In spite of these concerns, however, there
also exists some evidence to suggest encourag-
ing trends in China’s rural public goods pro-
vision. First, rural public service expenditures
are increasing (World Bank 2007). Moreover, at
the local level, public resources are increasingly
directed toward public goods rather than enter-
prise investment (Zhang et al. 2007). Finally,
reforms are being introduced across government
levels and service sectors in an effort to improve
the administrative capacity for delivery of public
goods and services (World Bank 2007). Hence,
policy will continue to be an important lever
for improving rural standards of living through
the provision of more and better quality public
goods and services.
Policy also contributes to variation in invest-
ment spending across different types of pub-
lic goods. Roads, for instance, have become a
priority item of central government in recent
years (Zhang et al. 2007). As Table 1 indi-
cates, expenditure for road construction exceeds
investment in other project types, and the gap
between roads and irrigation, the next largest
item, is growing wider. Recent efforts have been
directed most critically toward two kinds of rural
road projects, including tong chang gong cheng,
which aim to increase the carrying capacity of
existing roads and tong da gong cheng, which
are intended to increase the coverage of the road
network (Ministry of Communication 2005).
Although road construction depends importantly
on local funding sources as well as those from
above, its priority position at the central level
has certainly contributed to its dominant share
of total investment spending. In contrast, items
such as drinking water and irrigation constitute
smaller shares of total investment spending in
recent years. With respect to central funding,
drinking water received somewhat greater atten-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s, with funding to
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TABLE 1
Annual Investments in Rural Public Goods by
Year, 2001–2006 (Billion Yuan)
Roadsa
Primary
Schoolsb
Village
Clinicsc
Drinking
Waterd Irrigationd
2001 35.8 7.57 3.50 7.04
2002 49.5 13.21 8.10 10.00
2003 81.8 9.87 3.91 10.46
2004 124.2 12.05 0.79 3.89 8.76
2005 139.9 13.31 0.76 3.27 10.66
2006 159.7 0.76 12.9 6.88
aInvestment in rural roads includes fund from all sources.
Data are taken from the 2001–2006 Nian Gonglu Shuilu
Jiaotong Hangye Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (Annual Public
Statistics on Roadway and Waterway Transportation).
bInvestment in rural primary schools is derived by mul-
tiplying the rural share of government appropriations for
primary schools to the total amount of primary school cap-
ital investment, and therefore represents budgeted capital
investment in rural primary schools. Capital investment data
are taken from 2002 to 2007 Zhongguo Jiaoyu Tongji Nian-
jian (China Education Statistical Yearbook ) and government
appropriation data are from the 2003–2007 Zhongguo Tongji
Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook ).
cData are taken from the 2005–2007 Zhongguo
Weisheng Tongji Nianjian (China Health Statistical Year-
book ).
dInvestment in rural irrigation and drinking water
includes funds from all sources. Data for 2001–2005 are
taken from the 2001–2005 Nian Shuili Tongji Nianjian
(Annual Statistical Yearbook for Water Resources). Data for
2006 irrigation investment are from the 2006 Nian Shuili
Fazhan Tongji Gongbao (Annual Public Statistical Report
on Water Resource Development ). Data for 2006 drinking
water investment are from the 2007 Nian Zhengfu Zhinong
Touzi Zhinan (2007 Guidelines for Government to Support
Agriculture).
alleviate severe deficiencies in access, targeted
mostly at inland regions. However, since 1984,
the central government has maintained the posi-
tion that drinking water is primarily the respon-
sibility of villages themselves and subsidies are
to be provided only in special circumstances
(Ministry of Water Resources 1984). Similarly,
construction of irrigation facilities has been a
rather low priority for central government in the
post-reform period, with farmers and villages
taking the main role. Recent central government
efforts have been directed toward water conser-
vancy projects in areas with large-scale irriga-
tion already in place.2 That investment spending
on clinics is especially low does not imply that
2. Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Tuijin
Shehuizhuyi Xinnongcun Jianshe de Ruogan Yijian (Several
Suggestions of the CPC Central Committee and the State
Council on Promoting the Construction of a New Socialist
Countryside), December 31, 2005.
central government has abandoned rural health
services, but it may have focused more attention
toward financing services—through programs
such as the New Rural Cooperative Medi-
cal Scheme, for instance (World Bank 2007),
rather than building infrastructure for health care
providers.
Increasingly, the funds available from upper
level governments are offered as a supplement
to local resources, and so, as our data will
show, the number of jointly funded projects is
increasing, relative to projects funded by a sin-
gle source, whether it is village or other levels.
Recent fieldwork3 also suggests that an invest-
ment reward is displacing the investment grant
as a means of upper level government subsidy
for small-scale infrastructure construction in at
least some areas of rural China. That is to say
that the upper level funds are not made avail-
able until the project is completed, and has been
checked and approved by the relevant upper
level government agency. Taken together, these
trends imply a greater tendency for final direc-
tions of spending to be set at lower levels, taking
local needs and preferences into account, while
upper level governments serve in a guiding but
not leading capacity—using their resources to
augment those raised locally and to encourage
but not mandate particular kinds of infrastruc-
ture construction.
III. DATA AND PUBLIC GOODS INVESTMENTS
IN SAMPLE VILLAGES
The main data to be utilized in this paper
are drawn from the latter two rounds of a sam-
ple survey initiated in 2003, conducted by the
Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy, Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences. The 2003 sam-
ple included 2,459 villages in six provinces,4
while the 2005 and 2006 follow-up focused
on a 101 village subsample, selected randomly
from among the villages surveyed in five of
the original six provinces. The five provinces
included are Jiangsu, representing the southeast,
Sichuan, representing the southwest, Shaanxi,
representing the northwest, Hebei, representing
the north central region, and Jilin, representing
the northeast.
3. Field studies were conducted by co-authors Yi and
Zhang in Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and other provinces in 2007 and
2008.
4. More information on the 2003 sample is available in
Luo et al. (2007a).
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The data used in this paper were collected
through surveys of households and village lead-
ers carried out in two rounds. In the 2005
household survey, eight household respondents
selected randomly from within each village were
asked to self-report their investment priority
rankings and willingness-to-pay for five pub-
lic goods that are closely related to villagers’
production and consumption—roads, primary
schools, clinics, drinking water,5 and irrigation.
Rankings were made by an ordinal assignment
of the numbers 1–5 across the five goods, repre-
senting the highest to lowest priority for invest-
ment, should the village be given 50,000 yuan
to invest in a single public good. Willingness-
to-pay was coded as a yes or no response to
the question, “Were each villager asked to con-
tribute 20 yuan to this project, are you willing
to make the contribution?”
In the 2005 village leader survey, the enu-
merators interviewed one village cadre in each
village. The cadre was selected from among the
party secretary, the village head, or the village
accountant and was queried regarding village
socioeconomic characteristics, the existing stock
of public goods, and the leader’s public goods
demand. The set of questions used to elicit pub-
lic goods demand from village leaders was the
same as that for households except that in the
case of village leaders, one additional public
good (sanitation services) was added to the list.
In 2006, the 101 villages were contacted by tele-
phone to obtain information on the most recent
round of public works projects. The respondents
answered detailed questions about the purpose,
starting time, completion time, total investment,
funding sources (including any matching funds
or labor supplied locally), the implementing
institutions, and the intended beneficiaries for
every public goods project undertaken between
2005 and 2006.
For the purpose of getting the most consistent
information, the 2006 questions were taken from
a module of the survey form used in 2005 and
the respondents in the 2005 and 2006 surveys
are the same in most cases. The two rounds of
surveys facilitate our study of how local demand
for public goods, measured at their end-of-2004
levels, correspond to the projects implemented
5. Drinking water projects refer specifically to public
construction of individual household wells to provide water
for consumption uses (as opposed to production use of water,
such as irrigation). The main advantage to the households
to whom wells are provided is the reduction of time and
energy spent in fetching water.
between the beginning of 2005 and the end of
2006, controlling for other relevant variables.
Information about 184 public goods projects
implemented between 2005 and 2006 in the
sample villages is provided in Table 2. Road and
bridge construction account for better than 40%
of the total, and other dominant projects include
drinking water facilities and irrigation. Together,
these three types account for more than 70%
of projects undertaken. They also account for a
considerable share of total investment spending
across villages. Eighty-three of the sampled
villages had at least one public goods project
within our five categories of main interest:
road, school, clinic, drinking water, or irrigation
facilities.
In recent years, there is a clear trend in
the direction of villages partnering with upper
level governments to fund public goods projects,
as Table 3 demonstrates. The share of projects
TABLE 2
Number and Size of Public Goods Projects in
101 Surveyed Villages, 2005–2006
Project Type
Number of
Projects
Project
Size
(1,000
Yuan)
Project Size
Including
Corvee
Labors (1,000
Yuan)
Roads and bridges 80 299.07 322.56
Irrigation
facilities
32 108.15 118.27
Drinking water
facilities
25 268.01 273.31
Recreation centers 16 64.10 64.15
Eco-forest 7 26.71 50.17
School
construction
6 143.83 147.82
Beautify
environment
6 78.95 78.95
Drainage facilities 4 9.38 9.46
Biogas/methane 3 93.00 93.00
Clinic
construction
1 18.00 18.00
Sanitation 1 30.00 30.00
Land
improvement
1 18.12 18.12
Construct terrace 1 240.00 288.00
Elderly care
center
1 120.00 120.00
Total/average 184 203.14 217.13
Source: Authors’ sample survey data.
Notes: Three reported projects are omitted here because
of extreme or missing project size values. In addition,
five projects implemented in the model stage of the New
Countryside Construction Project are omitted as all of these
projects exhibit characteristics that make them appear to be
more private than public goods.
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TABLE 3
Share of Projects by Funding Source
(Percent), 1998–2006
Years
Funded
Fully by
Village
Funded Fully
by Upper
Governments
Funded
Jointly Total
1998–2002 50.16 25.90 23.93 100
2003–2004 49.69 24.69 25.62 100
2005–2006 35.94 10.94 53.13 100
Average 46.63 21.91 31.46 100
Source: Authors’ sample survey data.
funded solely by the village, as well as those
that rely entirely on upper level government
sources, is declining. By 2005–2006, more than
half of all projects are funded by the village in
tandem with resources from above. The majority
of the road, school, clinic, drinking water, and
irrigation projects are jointly funded, though in
the cases of both roads and irrigation, better than
one-third of these projects are funded by village
resources alone (Table 4).
Our descriptive analysis shows that the stock
of public goods in 2004 varies by areas, and
the pattern of regional variation revealed by the
survey data and published statistics is roughly
similar (Table 5). Villages in Jiangsu appear
to enjoy the highest accessibility to public
goods, with the possible exception of primary
schools. That many villages lack their own
primary school here may reflect school mergers
across villages (which may improve the quality
of the education offered there) rather than a
deficiency in coverage. Leaving primary schools
TABLE 4
Five Types of Public Goods by Funding
Source (Percent), 2005–2006
Project
Funded
Fully by
Village
Funded Fully
by Upper
Governments
Funded
Jointly Total
Roads and
bridges
38.27 11.11 50.62 100
School
construction
0.00 33.33 66.67 100
Clinic
construction
0.00 0.00 100.00 100
Drinking
water
24.00 4.00 72.00 100
Irrigation 34.38 9.38 56.25 100
Source: Authors’ sample survey data.
aside, Shaanxi is the province where village
public good stocks are the lowest according
to the published data. These findings are in
agreement with the survey data for the cases
of roads, clinics, and irrigated land. According
to the survey data, however, rural households in
Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Jilin all have notably low
rates of access to tap water.
IV. LOCAL DEMAND AND POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION IN SAMPLE VILLAGES
Priority rankings of and willingnesses to
pay for public goods results from households
and village leaders are tabulated separately and
presented in Table 6. While leaders were sys-
tematically less willing to pay for additional
service than their village constituents, in fact
TABLE 5
The Stock of Public Goods by Sample Province (Percent), 2004
Villages with a
Tar Road
Villages with a
Primary School
Villages with a
Clinic
Households with
Access to Tap Water
Effectively
Irrigated
Cultivated Land
Jiangsu 90.0 n.a. 45.0 30.3 90.0 89.5 88.5 92.5 84.2 75.8
Sichuan 50.0 n.a. 65.0 41.0 90.0 85.7 26.5 66.0 56.5 27.3
Shannxi 40.0 n.a. 90.0 79.6 80.0 77.8 55.8 28.5 17.4 25.2
Jilin 66.7 n.a. 61.9 72.7 95.2 92.6 20.5 47.9 32.7 28.6
Hebei 70.0 n.a. 80.0 44.6 90.0 92.8 79.9 80.3 76.4 64.8
China 63.7 n.a. 68.3 53.1 89.1 80.7 53.9 60.0 53.6 41.9
Source: For each category of public good, the left column is calculated using authors’ sample survey data, while the
right column presents data from national published sources. Published statistics for percent of villages with a primary school
were unavailable for 2004 and so values presented here represent 2003 and are drawn from the 2004 Zhongguo Tongji
Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook ). Clinic and tap water figures are from the 2005 Zhongguo Weisheng Tongji Nianjian
(China Hygiene Statistical Yearbook ). Irrigated land statistics are from the 2005 Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical
Yearbook ).
YI, HARE & ZHANG: PUBLIC GOODS AND LOCAL DEMAND 121
some similarities between leaders and villagers
are apparent across the five goods under inspec-
tion. Very clearly, the highest willingness-to-pay
and greatest priority is accorded to roads rel-
ative to any of the other four goods. Each of
schools, drinking water, and irrigation facilities
received moderate support, with the vast major-
ity of households and village leaders willing to
pay for additional investment in these areas, and
votes cast more or less evenly across these three
in terms of priority.
Clinics fared the worst in the rank orderings,
even though a high percentage of households
and leaders were willing to pay for additional
clinic investment. It may be surprising that
both schools and clinics did not achieve higher
rankings, given their important contribution to
development of human capital and well-being.
However in recent years, the central govern-
ment has taken greater initiative to ensure the
provision of schooling in rural China (World
Bank 2007), perhaps weakening villagers’ sense
of own-responsibility for this item. With respect
to clinics, though the quality of health care ser-
vices is variable and exhibits serious deficien-
cies in at least some villages, however, most
clinics are operated privately and therefore may
be seen as less suitable targets for the invest-
ment of public resources. The rather high pro-
portion of willingness-to-pay reported across all
goods for both households and villagers indi-
cates perhaps that setting the bar at 20 yuan
is too low. However, the 20 yuan level was
selected for questioning as it represents the max-
imum amount that may be collected from vil-
lagers under the tax for fee reform discussed
in the introductory section. To that end, our
findings reflect a substantial appetite for a vari-
ety of different public goods and therefore the
rank orderings may serve as a better indicator
of underlying priorities.
To attend a meeting is the most common
way for villagers to participate in village man-
agement and express their demand for public
goods. Generally, villagers classify these meet-
ings into six types: party branch meeting, vil-
lage committee meeting, village committee and
party branch meeting, small group meeting, vil-
lage representative assembly, and village general
assembly. Of these, the last three types offer
the broadest opportunities for participation by
villagers because only members of the Com-
munist Party or village cadres will be eligible
to attend the first three types. Typically, atten-
dance at small group meetings includes mem-
bers of all resident households in the small group
(or natural village). There may be an elected
or appointed small group leader to facilitate
the discussion and carry forward the collective
response, perhaps even implementing a group
project of their own. The village representa-
tive assembly is a meeting of the representatives
elected by the villagers to make decisions about
issues concerning the whole village (rather than
just one group) or to raise questions for broader
village discussion. The village general assem-
bly includes members of all resident house-
holds in the village, focusing mainly on the
issues that require village-wide participation.
The meetings serve as an opportunity for ideas
and opinions to coalesce, ultimately informing
leadership of common sentiments or complaints.
Although upper level government representa-
tives normally do not attend or participate,
they would likely be informed about meeting
outcomes through subsequent applications for
resources or other requests. Leaders at any level
cannot ignore completely the preferences and
TABLE 6
Measures of Survey Respondents’ Demand for Five Types of Public Goods, 2004
Type of Project
Respondent Roads Schools Clinics Drinking Water Irrigation
Percentage of respondents willing to pay 20 yuan for this type of project
Household 90.47 77.35 72.12 82.71 80.56
Village leader 82.18 65.98 58.00 76.24 71.29
Percentage of respondents who rank this type of project as first priority
Household 42.76 17.83 6.43 16.35 17.29
Village leader 50.50 17.35 5.00 12.87 11.88
Source: Authors’ sample survey data.
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demands of the villagers as they depend on
their support—including contributions of labor
and financial resources—for project implemen-
tation. Lack of local support for a project will
make it difficult or impossible to proceed.
In 2004, among the 808 households sampled,
536 (or about 66%) attended at least one small
group meeting, village representatives meeting,
or village general assembly. Broken down more
finely, 364 households participated in at least
one small group meeting; 164 households par-
ticipated in at least one village representatives
meeting; and 334 households participated in at
least one village general assembly (Table 7).
The purpose of these meetings varies, though
public goods projects and elections are reported
to be the most frequent topics of discussion
summed across different meeting types. That
elections are high on the agenda is no surprise
as two-thirds of the villages conducted an elec-
tion that year when the term of their current
head expired. That frequency of public goods
projects discussion was nearly equally as high
as elections illustrates the high level of interest
villagers take in these projects, and the efforts
they make to voice their preferences. While vil-
lages generally convened general assemblies in
the case of elections, in contrast, public goods
projects headlined (or were the most frequently
reported discussion topic, in any case) at both
small group meetings and village representative
meetings.
V. DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC GOODS
IMPLEMENTATION AND INVESTMENT
To further examine the impact of local
demand on the provision of public goods
projects during 2005–2006, we now turn to mul-
tivariate regression analysis. Our basic regres-
sion framework is as follows:
yi = α + βvillagers ∗ local villagers’ demandi
+ βleaders ∗ difference in demand between
villagers and village cadrei + βX ∗ Xi
+ βZ ∗ Zi + εi
The dependent variable yi represents alterna-
tively the dichotomous project implementation
variable, estimated using a linear probability
model, or the project investment level, estimated
using the Heckman 2-stage procedure to cor-
rect for selection bias. Implementation takes a
value of one if implementation of a project
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of the specified type was begun in 2005 or
2006. Investment measures the total amount of
funds (in units of 10,000 yuan) spent on the
project during the 2005–2006 period. Each vari-
able is measured at the village level (i) and we
estimate both implementation and investment
models using a system of equations (seemingly
unrelated regression [SUR]) approach, with a
separate equation for each of three project types
(roads, drinking water, and irrigation).
Although we have consistently focused atten-
tion on five types of public goods until now
(roads, schools, clinics, drinking water, and irri-
gation), at this point we drop schools and clinics
for practical purposes. Only one village in the
sample engaged in a clinic project in the survey
year. Meanwhile, implementation of a school
construction project is conditional on whether
the village already had a school, and as noted in
Table 5, a substantial portion of villages in the
sample do not, and may not be in the running to
get one if their school has already been merged
with other villages. Moreover, only six school
projects were conducted during the surveyed
interval. Therefore, small numbers of positive
responses in both cases, coupled with the smaller
data set for school projects, preclude meaningful
estimation for both schools and clinics.
Our main variable of interest in each model
is the local demand for the project type. As
we introduced in Section IV, we will use the
willingness-to-pay for and rank ordering of pub-
lic goods responses to measure local demand.
Willingness-to-pay lends itself easily to the for-
mulation of a dichotomous independent variable,
taking a value of one in cases, as previously
discussed, where the respondent was willing to
contribute 20 yuan toward a project. We con-
struct village level averages that report, respec-
tively, the willingness of surveyed households
and willingness of surveyed leaders to contribute
toward investment in each of the public goods.6
Specification of the ranking variable is some-
what more complex, as we have calculated a
rank index that serves to standardize responses
across respondents:
Rank Index =
(
1 − ni − 1
N
)
× 100%
where ni denotes the raw rank of project i
which was given by respondent and N denotes
6. Calculation of the household-based measures of pub-
lic good demand exclude any household in which at least one
member was a village cadre in 2004 to avoid confounding
villagers’ demand with that of village leaders.
the number of projects on the option list. The
resulting rankings are averaged separately for
households and for leaders within a village over
the five public goods. As a check of the robust-
ness of our results, we offer a third measure of
local demand—derived from a question about
satisfaction with existing public goods and ser-
vices on the household survey questionnaire.
This variable measures the percentage of house-
holds in the village reporting the binary response
of “dissatisfied” with the status quo. Measure-
ment of the village median presents an alterna-
tive to using the mean village demand. We use
the mean rather than the median because we
have an even number of villager respondents,
so often there are two medians for each village.
Using a series constructed of medians (when
there is one) and means of medians (when there
are two) yields results that are very similar to
those presented here.
To compare the influence of common vil-
lagers’ demand relative to that of village lead-
ers, we follow the approach of Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2005) and construct a variable to
represent the difference between households’
demand for the good and that reported by the
leader. A positive value reflects higher relative
valuation by households, whereas a negative
value implies higher relative valuation by the
leader. Hence, a negative and significant coeffi-
cient on this variable would suggest that village
leaders might use their influence to override the
demands of local residents. There is no village
leader counterpart for the satisfaction measure
of demand as this question was not included on
the village leaders’ questionnaire.
To shed light on how villagers’ reveal their
public goods’ demand to local leaders, we con-
struct a variable to proxy for household partic-
ipation in local politics. Political participation
is measured as the average number of small
group meetings, representative assemblies, or
general assemblies attended by village house-
holds in 2004. We construct an average measure
of attendance across the three different meet-
ing types because there is substantial provincial
variation in the types of meetings held most fre-
quently. We consider attendance in any one of
these meeting to be a valid measure of partici-
pation and therefore sum attendance across the
three types to avoid confounding the results with
other sources of (unobserved) provincial varia-
tion. Although frequency of meeting attendance
measures only one dimension of local political
participation, we feel that it is a meaningful
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proxy for the degree to which villagers are
engaged in local affairs. In a similar vein, Oi
and Rozelle (2000) use the frequency of vil-
lage representative assemblies to proxy for the
development of local representative politics. Our
measurement includes small group meetings and
village general assemblies as well, to capture
the full range of meetings at which common
villagers might be in attendance. This variable,
as well as its interaction with the demand vari-
able, are added to the regressions after a first
set of baseline estimates have been established.
The null hypothesis we test is whether greater
political participation increases the influence of
villagers’ demand on project outcomes.
Other variables (X) included in the model are
intended to control for variation in current vil-
lage resources (encompassing measures of natu-
ral resources as well as financial and political
capital), past access to investment for public
good infrastructure,7 and per capita tax collec-
tions. Finally, a set of province dummy variables
(Z) is included (with Jiangsu omitted) to control
for any unobserved province effects.
Our analysis now proceeds to measure deter-
minants of road, irrigation, and drinking water
project implementation (linear probability mod-
els) and road, irrigation, and drinking water
project investment (Heckman 2-stage models)
across the 101 villages in the sample. Means
and standard deviations of all regression vari-
ables are provided, for reference, in Table 8.
Variables measured at the household level (such
as demand for the public good and income) are
entered into our regressions as averages across
all the households surveyed within the village.
Discussion will turn first to the results of
the baseline model presented in Tables 9–11.
The system of linear probability implementation
regressions is run six times, including a baseline
model for each of the three specifications of the
demand variables, and a second expanded model
to include the meeting attendance and demand
interaction variables. Results are grouped by
project type to facilitate comparison across the
different demand specifications. In Table 9, we
observe that neither households’ nor leaders’
7. The past access to investment variable is measured
as the percentage of investment coming from outside the
village made in projects of that type (road, drinking water,
or irrigation) between 1998 and 2003. This percentage is
meant to proxy for the village’s past success in getting
upper level government funding for a particular project type,
and therefore may reflect villagers’ best information about
likelihoods of current funding.
demand is significant in explaining road project
implementation in five of the six specifications,
nor is meeting attendance or household income.
Presence of a collective enterprise in the village
may increase project implementation by as much
as 34 percentage points, but this result is sta-
tistically significant (with p-value of .07) only
in the dissatisfied specifications of demand.8 A
10 point increase in the percentage of cultivated
land that is hilly or mountainous raises the prob-
ability of road project implementation by about
5 percentage points. A 10-km increase in the
village distance from the township seat reduces
project implementation likelihood by about 24
percentage points. These results are consistent
with the notion that road projects may be most
heavily guided by planning at higher levels of
government, as might be most logical for a good
such as roads for which network effects are an
especially important consideration. The extent
of the spillover will naturally vary with the type
of road built, and unfortunately our data do not
give sufficient detail to distinguish between, for
instance, roads that connect small groups within
villages versus national highways. However, the
available information suggests that most road
projects probably create or improve links from
villages to townships and therefore can be seen
to offer village-wide benefits, in addition to gen-
erating positive externalities beyond the village
because of increased facilitation of communica-
tion, commerce, and other activities.
Drinking water presents a very different sort
of public good, where most of the final bene-
fit accrues directly to the recipient household,
with those households who gain wells enjoy-
ing quicker and easier access to their house-
hold water supply. Accordingly in Table 10,
we observe that local demand is significant in
all three of the baseline specifications of local
demand. There is no evidence to suggest that
the demands of local leaders override those of
households in the implementation of drinking
water projects. However, columns 4 and 6 of
Table 10 provide support for the role of local
political participation (meeting attendance) in
facilitating projects. Using the rank index spec-
ification and holding demand for drinking water
projects constant, a one meeting per household
increase in average meetings attendance raises
the probability of implementing a water project
8. Controls for presence of private enterprises were
included in earlier model specifications and found to be
insignificant in both the implementation and investment
regressions for all three of the public goods we analyze.
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TABLE 8
Descriptive Statistics of Regression Model Independent Variables (101 Villages)
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Household average rank index for road projects at the
beginning of 2005
0.79 0.13 0.43 1.00
Difference between villagers’ average and village cadre’s
rank index for road projects at the beginning of 2005
−0.04 0.21 −0.46 0.68
Percentage of households willing to pay for road projects at
the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.91 0.12 0.50 1.00
Difference between villagers’ and village cadre’s
willingness-to-pay for road projects at the beginning of
2005
−0.04 0.39 −0.57 0.95
Percentage of households dissatisfied with existing roads at
the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.46 0.29 0.00 1.00
Percentage of investment in road projects between 1998 and
2003 from outside the village (100%)
0.65 0.29 0.05 1.00
Length of muddy/gravel road per mu of cultivated land area
in 2004 (km/mu)
0.006 0.010 0.000 0.058
Length of tar/cement road per mu of cultivated land area in
2004 (km/mu)
0.001 0.004 0.000 0.033
Household average rank index for drinking water projects at
the beginning of 2005
0.57 0.15 0.28 0.93
Difference between villagers’ average and village cadre’s
rank index for drinking water projects at the beginning of
2005
−0.09 0.21 −0.53 0.47
Percentage of households willing to pay for drinking water
projects at the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.83 0.18 0.25 1.00
Difference between villagers’ and village cadre’s
willingness-to-pay for drinking water projects at the
beginning of 2005
−0.19 0.43 −0.73 0.77
Percentage of households dissatisfied with existing drinking
water infrastructure at the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.27 0.26 0.00 1.00
Percentage of investment in drinking water projects between
1998 and 2003 from outside the village (100%)
0.54 0.40 0.00 1.00
Percentage of households with access to tap water in 2004
(100%)
0.54 0.43 0.00 1.00
Household average rank index for irrigation projects at the
beginning of 2005
0.61 0.16 0.23 0.88
Difference between villagers’ average and village cadre’s
rank index for road irrigation at the beginning of 2005
0.002 0.271 −0.625 0.658
Percentage of households willing to pay for irrigation
projects at the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.81 0.19 0.25 1.00
Difference between villagers’ and village cadre’s willingness
to pay for irrigation projects at the beginning of 2005
−0.10 0.43 −0.77 0.85
Percentage of households dissatisfied with existing irrigation
infrastructure at the beginning of 2005 (100%)
0.33 0.27 0.00 1.00
Percentage of investment in irrigation projects between
1998 and 2003 from outside the village (100%)
0.50 0.39 0.00 1.00
Percentage of effectively irrigated cultivated land in 2004
(100%)
0.53 0.38 0.00 1.00
Net per capita income (yuan/person) 2608.47 1474.16 300.00 6596.00
Percentage of households who mainly engaged in industry
or commerce in 2004 (100%)
0.06 0.10 0.00 0.66
Number of fellow villagers employed by township or higher
level governments in 2004 (persons)
6.98 7.63 0.00 35.00
Per capita cultivated land in 2004 (mu/person) 1.73 1.53 0.00 8.10
Whether the village had a collective enterprise in 2004
(0 = no, 1 = yes)
0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Percentage of cultivated land with a slope higher than 25
degrees (100%)
0.15 0.23 0.00 0.90
Distance from village committee to township seat (km) 5.18 4.05 0.00 19.00
Average number of meetings attended per household 2.67 2.15 0.00 9.50
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by 2.2 percentage points. As drinking water
projects tend to have lower spillover—both
within and beyond the community—than the
other two projects we examine, perhaps meet-
ings serve to facilitate the negotiation and coor-
dination needed to come to agreement on project
plans.9 Resources matter as well, with previous
outside funding in drinking water projects, land
endowments, and the existence of a collective
enterprise all demonstrating a positive influence.
Again, we find that hilly or mountainous areas
implement more water projects, all else equal,
suggesting that the central government main-
tains some role in project placement.
The final good, irrigation (Table 11), per-
haps lies between roads and drinking water in
terms of its mix of public versus private bene-
fits. For instance, in ground water irrigation sys-
tems, neighboring households most often share
a single electric well, to spread high fixed con-
struction costs across more users. There is evi-
dence that local demand is important in project
outcomes (in the rank index and willingness-
to-pay specifications, though only the former
findings are statistically significant at conven-
tional levels). These findings also lend support
for the importance of village leaders’ demand.
The greatest rise in the likelihood of project
implementation stems from the simultaneous
increase of both villagers’ and leaders’ prior-
ity ranking (or reported willingness-to-pay). In
contrast, projects are less likely to be imple-
mented when villagers are dissatisfied with the
current irrigation infrastructure, perhaps sug-
gesting that irrigation is an unsuitable choice
for the region. Projects seem to be directed
toward villages where little outside investment
in irrigation has been made recently, and com-
pared to the other public goods we consid-
ered, irrigation projects seem especially concen-
trated in a single province—Jiangsu (the omit-
ted province). Villages located closer to their
township seat may have some advantage in get-
ting projects, though the effect is significant at
less than 10% in only one of the six specifi-
cations. One might expect that implementation
of irrigation projects is influenced by local per-
ceptions about land tenure security, and omis-
sion of this variable potentially introduces bias
into the estimated coefficients. However, includ-
ing a variable that measures the extent of vil-
lage land readjustments between 1999 and 2004
9. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this
point.
yields results that are little different from those
reported here.
Our regression framework treats local
demand as determined exogenously to project
implementation. For various reasons, the
assumption of exogeneity may be problematic.
For instance, under perfect population mobil-
ity, village residence, and therefore the demand
response, may be selected on the basis of the
array of public goods offered there. Perhaps
more appropriate to the Chinese case, rumors or
information leaks about possible future projects
may shape informants’ responses about the
kinds of public goods they desire. Therefore,
we conduct endogeneity tests of demand, utiliz-
ing the village’s existing stock of public goods
infrastructure and its labor force characteristics
(percent of village residents who work outside
the village as migrant laborers and percent of
village residents who work inside the village in
nonfarm jobs) as instruments. Application of a
Hausman test fails to reject the hypothesis (at
any conventional significance level) that demand
is determined exogenously for all three spec-
ifications of the demand variables, given the
available instruments. Absent any other infor-
mation about factors that may influence demand
for public goods without contributing toward
project outcomes, we are unable to perform any
further tests or corrections for endogeneity.
Table 12 presents the results of estimating
project investment, using a 2-stage Heckman
selection procedure. The first stage of the proce-
dure is a probit equation in which the dependent
variable represents project implementation and
the independent variables are all those included
in the expanded linear implementation estima-
tions. An inverse Mills’ ratio is constructed from
the probit coefficients and included in the sec-
ond stage equations, in which only observations
with positive investment values are included,
and the dependent variable measures the project
investment level. The second stage investment
equations for each of the three types of pub-
lic goods are once again run as a system of
equations to exploit any correlations in their
disturbances. The meetings variable and its
interaction with demand are excluded from the
investment equations because we expect that the
main impact of local political participation is on
the selection of project type. Once the project
is selected, fundraising is the responsibility of
local leaders and their superiors.
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TABLE 12a
Village Road Project Volume of Investment Results—SUR Heckman 2-Stage Selection Model
(1) (2) (3)
Rank Index
Measure of Local
Demand
Willingness-to-Pay
Measure of Local
Demand
Dissatisfaction
Measure of Local
Demand
Local villagers’ demand −97.92 −23.25 27.43
(0.22) (0.81) (0.59)
Difference in demand between villagers and village
cadre
−61.15 10.22 —
(0.28) (0.67)
Net per capita income (1,000 yuan/person) 38.94 71.29∗∗ 31.91
(0.23) (0.02) (0.35)
Square of net per capita income −4.66 −9.66∗∗ −2.8
(0.35) (0.04) (0.59)
Number of fellow villagers employed by town or
higher level government (ten persons)
4.61 14.14 5.95
(0.74) (0.33) (0.66)
Percentage of investment in road projects between
1998 and 2003 from outside the village
−56.48 −49.01 −67.29
(0.20) (0.24) (0.12)
Per capita cultivated land (mu/person) 24.72∗∗ 27.14∗∗ 26.72∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
Whether there is a collective enterprise in the village
(0 = no, 1 = yes)
−2.45 −39.21 37.65
(0.96) (0.40) (0.51)
Percentage of cultivated land with a slope steeper
than 25◦
−33.22 −133.56∗ 32.70
(0.70) (0.07) (0.70)
Distance from village committee to township seat
(10 km)
41.79 77.89∗∗ 11.86
(0.30) (0.04) (0.75)
Per capita tax—village revenue from retained fee and
additional agricultural tax in 2004 (yuan/person)
−2.90 −4.46∗∗ −2.40
(0.11) (0.02) (0.22)
Selection correction −80.92 −217.72∗∗∗ −21.49
(0.42) (0.01) (0.82)
Sichuan province 80.22 144.25∗∗∗ 72.42
(0.14) (0.01) (0.17)
Shannxi province 55.17 85.89∗∗ 88.87∗
(0.26) (0.05) (0.06)
Jilin province 55.25 104.61∗ 32.01
(0.38) (0.08) (0.58)
Hebei province 8.38 16.96 5.96
(0.84) (0.65) (0.88)
Constant 49.05 −8.92 −69.25
(0.68) (0.94) (0.50)
Mean of dependent variable (10,000 yuan) 38.51 38.51 38.51
Number of uncensored observations 67 67 67
Note: p-values are given in parentheses.
∗
.05 < p < .10; ∗∗.01 < p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
Turning to investment results for road
projects (Table 12a), only the village land en-
dowment, per capita, is significant consistently
across all three specifications of the model. This
result may suggest some importance of local
resources toward project funding, which is fur-
ther supported by the positive (but declining)
effect of per capita income on road invest-
ment (though this result is significant only for
the willingness-to-pay specification). Results on
hilly land and distance from the township seat
are similar to those from the road project imple-
mentation regressions—investments are greater
when village land is more hilly and village loca-
tion is more distant. Interestingly, higher per
capita tax collections seem to decrease road
project spending, though only the willingness-
to-pay specification is significant at better than
10%. Although higher tax collections may give
rise to higher levels of public resources, per-
haps they also reduce the capacity of leaders
to raise additional funds locally for incremental
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TABLE 12b
Village Drinking Water Project Volume of Investment Results—SUR Heckman 2-Stage
Selection Model
(1) (2) (3)
Rank Index
Measure of Local
Demand
Willingness-to-Pay
Measure of Local
Demand
Dissatisfaction
Measure of Local
Demand
Local villagers’ demand 223.82∗ 472.84∗∗ 106.58
(0.06) (0.02) (0.24)
Difference in demand between villagers and village
cadre
−58.19 −5.25 —
(0.30) (0.90)
Net per capita income (1,000 yuan/person) 93.88∗∗ 140.07∗∗∗ 88.41∗∗
(0.03) (0.01) (0.05)
Square of net per capita income −15.5∗∗ −19.2∗∗∗ −13.3∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
Number of fellow villagers employed by town or
higher level government (ten persons)
73.44∗∗∗ 74.39∗∗∗ 78.16∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Percentage of investment in drinking water projects
between 1998 and 2003 from outside the village
79.98∗∗ 102.43∗∗∗ 110.86∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Per capita cultivated land (mu/person) 30.57 92.92∗∗∗ 44.63∗
(0.12) (0.00) (0.05)
Whether there is a collective enterprise in the village
(0 = no, 1 = yes)
141.02∗∗ 215.29∗∗∗ 146.81∗∗
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02)
Percentage of cultivated land with a slope steeper
than 25◦
−54.92 −14.30 −69.16
(0.47) (0.86) (0.48)
Distance from village committee to township
seat (10 km)
30.02 17.97 61.15∗∗
(0.33) (0.58) (0.02)
Per capita tax—village revenue from retained fee and
additional agricultural tax in 2004 (yuan/person)
−4.54 −5.96 −4.26
(0.24) (0.14) (0.31)
Selection correction 27.30 87.35 45.97
(0.42) (0.12) (0.23)
Sichuan province 103.37 243.48∗∗ 174.15∗
(0.25) (0.04) (0.06)
Shannxi province 145.45∗ 303.47∗∗∗ 207.84∗∗
(0.09) (0.00) (0.02)
Jilin province −94.86 −235.71∗ −86.91
(0.29) (0.06) (0.39)
Hebei province −53.48 −71.42 −20.96
(0.56) (0.52) (0.82)
Constanta −452.15∗∗ −1, 060.32∗∗ −472.87∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
Mean of dependent variable (10,000 yuan) 27.33 27.33 27.33
Number of uncensored observations 25 25 25
Note: p-values are given in parentheses.
∗
.05 < p < .10; ∗∗.01 < p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
projects. The signs of the demand variables are
inconsistent across specifications and insignifi-
cant, corroborating our earlier conclusions about
local demand and project implementation—that
for a high spillover public good like roads, upper
level government planning trumps local desire
for the project. The negative coefficient on the
selection correction term suggests that factors
which predict project implementation may, if
anything, be negatively correlated with project
funding.
As in the case of project implementation,
results on drinking water investment (Table 12b)
offer some interesting contrasts to those we
observe for road projects. The role of local vil-
lagers’ demand is firmly established both in
the rank index and willingness-to-pay specifica-
tions of demand. Drinking water project invest-
ment also is positively influenced by a wide
variety of local resources—financial (per capita
income), political (fellow villagers employed
in upper level governments), and natural (per
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TABLE 12c
Village Irrigation Project Volume of Investment Results—SUR Heckman 2-Stage
Selection Modela
(1) (2) (3)
Rank Index
Measure of Local
Demand
Willingness-to-Pay
Measure of Local
Demand
Dissatisfaction
Measure of Local
Demand
Local villagers’ demand −177.03∗∗∗ −134.88∗∗∗ −14.51
(0.00) (0.00) (0.55)
Difference in demand between villagers and village
cadre
97.40∗∗ 26.36∗∗∗ —
(0.01) (0.00)
Net per capita income (1,000 yuan/person) −23.10 −31.89∗∗∗ 1.01
(0.24) (0.01) (0.96)
Square of net per capita income 5.8 7.52∗∗ −2.59
(0.26) (0.02) (0.61)
Number of fellow villagers employed by town or
higher level government (ten persons)
0.47 1.41 2.05
(0.93) (0.64) (0.71)
Percentage of investment in irrigation projects between
1998 and 2003 from outside the village
45.14 22.44 −21.87
(0.10) (0.14) (0.43)
Per capita cultivated land (mu/person) −1.31 −11.33∗∗∗ −2.70
(0.77) (0.00) (0.62)
Percentage of cultivated land with a slope steeper
than 25◦
4.40 −0.07 −24.23
(0.82) (1.00) (0.26)
Distance from village committee to township
seat (10 km)
31.61∗ 37.00∗∗∗ −11.67
(0.09) (0.00) (0.55)
Per capita tax—village revenue from retained fee and
additional agricultural tax in 2004 (yuan/person)
1.46∗ 2.02∗∗∗ 0.30
(0.06) (0.00) (0.76)
Selection correction −69.65∗∗ −58.27∗∗∗ −2.80
(0.02) (0.00) (0.93)
Sichuan province 37.44 52.03∗∗ −28.17
(0.23) (0.02) (0.38)
Shannxi province 38.26 51.49∗ −24.44
(0.32) (0.06) (0.64)
Jilin province 76.37∗∗ 92.07∗∗∗ −13.59
(0.04) (0.00) (0.79)
Hebei province 30.79 40.05∗∗ −38.22
(0.31) (0.04) (0.26)
Constant 140.30∗∗∗ 154.64∗∗∗ 78.7∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Mean of dependent variable (10,000 yuan) 15.14 15.14 15.14
Number of uncensored observations 25 25 25
Note: p-values are given in parentheses.
aWhether the village has a collective enterprise is dropped because of colinearity.
∗
.05 < p < .10; ∗∗.01 < p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01.
capita land), in addition to the presence of one
or more collective enterprises. Higher levels
of past outside investment in drinking water
projects is correlated with higher current lev-
els. Finally, positive (though largely insignifi-
cant) coefficients on the selection term suggests
that likelihoods of project implementation and
levels of investment move in the same direc-
tion—villages which are more likely to imple-
ment drinking water projects also tend to invest
more in their projects.
In the case of irrigation projects (Table 12c),
many factors that predict project implementation
contribute negatively toward investment—this
is true of the selection correction which con-
trols for unobservables, in addition to a number
of the observed variables. For instance, if both
villagers and leaders express high demand for
irrigation projects, investment levels tend to be
lower. Perhaps communities with uniform high
demand tend to implement irrigation projects
frequently, but on a smaller scale. A larger
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volume of investment is predicted by lower
incomes, lower land endowments, and greater
distance from townships. These findings suggest
there may be some intervention on the part of
upper government in funding selected irrigation
projects that would fail to achieve equivalent
local support. Higher local tax receipts also con-
tribute to higher irrigation investment. Finally,
while villages in Jiangsu, the omitted province,
enjoy higher likelihoods of project implementa-
tion, the reported project investment tends to be
lower there than in other provinces, often sig-
nificantly so.
VI. CONCLUSION
Local governance and public goods provision
in rural China has been the subject of grow-
ing attention, with emphasis on ensuring that
delivery of services is sufficient for sustained
economic growth. Several concerns about the
status quo have been noted, including inefficient
matching of projects to communities, provision
deficiencies because of shortfalls in funding, and
severe regional disparities. Our findings speak
most directly to the first of these issues. We
find evidence to suggest that, contrary to some
popular opinion, local demand seems to exhibit
a varied pattern of influence on project imple-
mentation, with a stronger role for local demand
the lower is the spillover associated with the
good. Furthermore, our findings suggest that vil-
lage level participatory bodies (such as small
group meetings, village representative assem-
blies, and village general assemblies) provide
opportunities for households to voice their pref-
erences and leverage public goods outcomes bet-
ter suited to their needs. Consistent with Putnam
(1993), our results suggest some prescriptive
antidote to the problem of mismatching—that
civic engagement gives rise to better govern-
ment and more effective public service. More-
over, our assessment of public goods investment
patterns suggests that the current system of coor-
dination between local and upper governments
demonstrates some awareness of how and where
the payoffs to investment are generated, with
local resources being a more important deter-
minant of investment in low spillover public
goods. Meanwhile, we do not deny the concerns
expressed elsewhere concerning the potential
inequities associated with fiscal decentralization,
as local resources are shown to contribute signif-
icantly, albeit to varying degrees, in the project
investment levels of each of the public goods
types that we analyze.
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